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Abstract
This paper studies the pricing of software development outsourcing. Two pricing
techniques – time and material and fixed price – are described and the economic
conditions for selecting between them are discussed.  Using agency theory and
transaction cost economics, it is predicted that risky and specific systems will be
priced on time and material basis while other projects will be fixed price.   An
additional prediction is that confidence in the vendor’s auditing of resources is
essential for time and material contracts.
The predictions are tested on fourteen external software development projects in two
large corporations.  Quantitative measures of risk, specificity and confidence are
utilised, but the data-set does not support the theoretical predictions.  In order to
explain this result, interviews with senior managers at the two corporations have been
conducted.  Both disagree with the theoretical prescriptions: one contracts risky
projects on fixed price basis, preferring to pay a risk-premium rather than to re-
budget.  The second expert allows fixed price only with trusted vendors, preferring
time and material with all other vendors.
Keywords
Software Development, Outsourcing, Pricing, Agency Theory, Transaction Cost
Economics
1. Introduction
Outsourcing is a popular way for organizations to develop software as it gives access
to expertise and scale unavailable internally (Nelson, Richmond & Seidmann 1996,
Lacity, Willcocks & Feeny 1996).  In this paper we ask how such development
services are priced. The two basic pricing techniques are Fixed Price, when a price is
set in advance for the specified system and services, and Time and Material where the
customer pays the vendor’s costs, typically on an hourly rate per programmer (Kutten
1998, Roditti 1998). The trade literature mentions several variations on these
techniques, for example, flexible fixed price where the functional specification is
priced in advance and the reminder of the project will be priced after the completion
of the specification.  Another example is time and material with a cap, either for the
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entire project or for specified major deliverables.  A recent study of 167 external off-
shore projects reports that fixed price contracts are the most frequent, contracts which
mix the two pricing techniques are less frequent, and time and material contracts are
the least used (Banerjee & Duflo 2000).
The Economics literature see these two basic pricing techniques as demonstrating the
trade-off in external procurement (Laffont & Tirole 1993).  Under a fixed price
contract, the supplier bears the full cost; thus, he has an incentive to exert optimal
effort but is also encouraged to overstate expected cost.  Under a time and material
contract, the supplier has no reason to overstate expected cost but has no incentive to
exert effort.  This trade-off results in using fixed price for standardised products with
low cost uncertainty, while time and material is used for one-off projects which
involve considerable cost uncertainty (Baron & Besanko 1987).  An alternative
explanation does not assume pre-contractual cost uncertainty, but show that time and
material pricing is preferred to fixed price when post-contractual changes and
adaptations are probable (Bajari & Tadelis 2001).  A third explanation for the two
pricing techniques is centred on firm reputation – established firms are trusted with
time and material contracts while new firms are not (Banerjee & Duflo 2000).
These various theoretical models seem to be relevant to software development. In
particular, cost uncertainty as well as adaptations and changes are typical of software
development.  For example, Boehm et al. (2000) estimate that at the very initial phase
of a project (‘concept of operation’) estimated cost is between 50% and 200% of the
actual cost; at the requirements specification stage, estimated cost is between 75% and
150% of the actual cost. These observations agree with the advice in the computer
contracting literature; for example, Roditti (1998, p. 7-24) explains that ‘pricing is
very difficult for the vendors and ill understood by users’; the difficulty stems from
the vendor’s uncertainty about the amount of work required to achieve operational
software.
Our research question regards the conditions that influence the choice between time
and material and fixed price contracts.  Two micro-economic theories, Agency
Theory (Laffont and Martimort, 2002) and Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson
2000), are used to study possible decision criteria.  These are phrased as predictions:
fixed price contracts are predicted for low risk and non-specific systems and time and
material contracts are predicted for high risk and specific projects with trusted
vendors.
In order to test these predictions, we accessed two large Irish companies with
considerable experience in outsourcing software development.  The seven largest
recent projects were selected and a senior procurement manager in each company was
asked to assess the projects’ risk and specificity.  The data showed considerable
differences between the companies, so a separate analysis of each data-set was
required.  However, the simple statistical analysis used could not support the
predictions.
As a final stage in this research, we conducted open interviews with managers at the
two companies.  Their views are considerably different from our theoretical
predictions.  Although they mostly accept the importance of the theoretic constructs,
some of their conclusions are opposite to the theoretical prescriptions.  In particular,
one of these experts prefers fixed price when risk is high, and one is willing to
consider fixed price only with reputable and trusted vendors while she prefers time
and material contracts with all other vendors.
The paper continues in Section 2 with a brief theoretical exposition and three
predictions.  Section 3 presents the method and Section 4 the quantitative results and
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analysis.  Section 5 presents a summary of the open interviews and a simple
qualitative analysis.  We discuss the results, contributions and limitations in Section 6.
2. Predictions
This study focuses on the economic criteria for pricing software development
contracts and uses two theories of contracting – Agency Theory and Transaction Cost
Economics.  For recent reviews of the theories, see Laffont and Martimort (2002) and
Williamson (2000); both theories do not assume full information and full rationality,
and both have been extensively tested (Eisenhardt 1993, Salanié 1997, Shelanski &
Klein 1995, Boerner & Macher 2002).  In the next paragraphs, the theories are
described very briefly, their application to software development pricing is discussed
and the resulting predictions are presented.
Agency theory assumes an uncertain venture that is owned by a principal and
performed by an agent whose actions are not fully observable.  Outsourcing of
software development fits this description well as uncertainty is significant and
performance is difficult to measure.  A linear agency model (Holmstrom 1989)
demonstrates the trade-off between incentives and risk sharing – if the venture is sold
to the agent, he would exert maximum effort, but will bear the full risk; however, if
the agent is paid a flat fee, he would bear no risk but would have no incentive to exert
effort.  The model shows then that a combination of a flat fee and performance-tied
payments is optimal, and that risk reduces the likelihood and size of the performance-
based payments. The reason is that for a risky project the agent would require a high
premium to accept the risk of performance-based payments.
We interpret fixed price contracts as performance-based with respect to the
development cost.  This is because the vendor keeps cost savings and pays cost
overruns.  Namely, fixed price contracts reward the vendor for his cost performance
and are thus performance-based.  Consequently, using the linear model proposition, it
is predicted that fixed price and time and material contracts are related to risk in the
following manner:
H1: Fixed price contracts are likelier for low risk projects; time and material contracts
are likelier for high risk projects.
An intuitive way to think about the prediction is to consider the risk premium a
vendor charges for fixed price.  If the risk and the resulting premium are high, a large
customer with many projects would prefer to take the risk and save the premium.
There are several assumptions implicit in our agency reasoning.  Firstly, we assume
that the system functionality can be defined well enough to negotiate (and compete)
on a fixed price.  Secondly, although our reasoning is centred on cost, we assume that
the overall risk of the project should be considered.  Namely, difficulties with
achieving the required functionality (or quality, or effectiveness) are assumed to
increase costs as more resources are needed to overcome the difficulties. Thirdly, a
useful simplifying assumption is that customer and vendor share the same information
about the project, in particular their assessments for cost and risk are similar.  This
should be plausible for large enough projects which are thoroughly discussed between
customer and vendor.
Turning now to transaction cost economics, it assumes that all complex contracts are
incomplete (as result of bounded rationality) and are constructed to protect against
post-contractual opportunism (Williamson 1998).  The theory asserts that any issue
that can be formulated as a contracting problem is usefully addressed by considering
transaction costs; these include the cost of negotiating a contract, consummating and
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safeguarding it.  The main prediction of the theory is then the discriminating
alignment hypothesis: transactions which differ in their attributes are aligned with
governance structures so as to economise on transaction costs (Williamson 2000).
Of the many attributes for describing transactions, one is the primary focus of the
theory – a higher degree of relationship specific assets is associated with more
hierarchical contracts.  Namely, when customer-specific investment is needed,
contracts include (hierarchical) controls to ensure such investment and to reduce the
likelihood and costs of vendor opportunism.  On the other hand, when a transaction
does not require much customer-specific investment, a simple market transaction is
sufficient.   In addition to specific investment, greater uncertainty, more complex
transactions and more frequent exchange increase the contractual hazards brought on
by specific investment and result in more hierarchical contracts (Boerner & Macher
2002).
We interpret time and material contracts as a relatively hierarchical governance
structure, and fixed price contracts as relatively close to a market transaction.  The
reason is that a time and material contract entails monitoring and some controlling of
the vendor actions and costs.  Because a resource rather than a final outcome is
contracted (Lacity et al 1996), time and material pricing is quite close to an internal
hierarchical control of a project.  In contrast, a fixed price contract must pre-specify a
system in great detail, but does not entail hierarchical control along the project
progress.
We then choose to focus on the primary attribute associated with hierarchical
governance, and predict that fixed price is likely for projects which do not entail high
customer-specific investment.  If such investment is needed, the customer will prefer
a more hierarchical governance structure by contracting on a time and material basis:
H2: Fixed price contracts are likelier for projects which are not customer-specific;
time and material contracts are likelier for customer-specific projects.
In addition to risk and specificity, we consider a third construct – the customer’s
confidence in a vendor’s time and material accounting.  Lack of confidence was
identified in a previous study (Lichtenstein 1999) as a possible reason for rejecting
time and material contracts.  Although confidence is not explicitly studied in the
economic theories used, it fits both of them well.  Agency theory postulates that long-
term relationships lessen the agency costs (Eisenhardt 1993); long term relationship
may be interpreted as a way to build confidence.  The transaction cost economics
assumption about the vendor opportunism and the possibility of a hold-up
(Williamson 1998) may also be qualified when confidence specific to time and
material accounting has been built.  The result of this reasoning is our final prediction:
H3:  Time and material contracts are likelier if the customer has confidence in the
vendors’ time and material accounting.
3. Method
We had access to two large Irish corporations with considerable portfolios of external
software projects.  In each company, a senior IS procurement manager served as our
respondent.  The respondents were first asked to delineate the portfolios of all external
IS projects during the last two years which included a substantial custom-made
software component.  The seven largest projects in each portfolio were selected; we
ensured that our respondents knew these projects well.  The respondents were asked
to answer a questionnaire for each of these projects.  The first questionnaires were
filled-in by us, and the respondents were asked to answer the remaining
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questionnaires at their own convenience.  The small number of projects and the self-
administration of questionnaires were due to time and access restrictions in the two
companies.
The questionnaire includes about thirty questions that cover pricing, risk, specificity
and confidence.  A version of the questionnaire was pre-tested by discussing it with
two experienced IT project managers.  Several questions were changed and clarified
and several items were removed because they did not fit the outsourcing context.  The
final questionnaire is given in the appendix.
The risk instrument is a condensed version of the Barki, Rivard and Talbot (1993)
questionnaire.  Risk is defined as the product of uncertainty surrounding a project and
the magnitude of potential loss associated with project failure. Uncertainty is then
measured by five factors including eighteen items: newness, scope, expertise,
complexity and organisational environment.  The potential loss measure asks for the
impact on six functional areas if the system is not implemented or has operational
problems.  Subjective items are measured by a seven point Likert scale with the
following labels: strongly disagree, disagree, somewhat disagree, neutral attitude,
somewhat agree, agree, strongly disagree. Items are normalised and averaged to get
uncertainty and loss scores; the risk score is calculated as the product of uncertainty
and loss.
The specificity instrument follows Ang and Beath (1993) by asking about the effort
needed to convey the system requirements, the training a system-analyst would need
and the delay caused by hiring a new analyst.
Confidence in the vendors time and material accounting is measured by nine
questions.  The objective items follow the agency literature (Eisenhardt 1993) and ask
about the length of time relationship with the vendor existed, the number and size of
previous projects and whether any of them was on a time and material basis. The
subjective items measure agreement with statements about confidence with respect to
time and material accounting, reputation and familiarity with the development team.
The confidence score is the average of the normalised nine items.
4. Quantitative data and analysis
The first research site is denoted by B, it is a service organisation with about two
million customers, ten thousand employees and a relatively large IS department. The
second site is T, another service organisation, with about two million customers,
fifteen hundred employees and a small IS department.  For both companies,
information systems are strategic and external software development has been
common for many years. Our respondents are senior managers at the IS departments,
with about ten years of IT experience and business academic education.  From 2000
to 2002, B had about 20 external IS projects and T about 60.  The data-set consists of
the seven largest projects, by cost, in each company; data about these projects is
summarised in tables 1 and 2.
Contract Description
B1 An enhancement to a bookkeeping system
B2 A follow on for a Customer Relationship Management system
B3 A Data-Base of project commitments
B4 A system to assists the company’s core retail Transaction Processing
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B5 A system to rate customer related risk
B6 A system to deliver managerial reports across the company network
B7 A system for Business to Business transactions on the Internet
T1 Euro conversion of a financial system
T2 Updating customers accounts with details of electronic fund transfers
T3 The system provides customer data to customer care representatives
T4 A system that allows customers to use low-fee services
T5 System upgrade to cater for the Euro
T6 New software and enhancements for real-time billing
T7 Reintroducing a customer service
Table 1. Project descriptions
In Table 2, the pricing column for T uses FP to denote fixed-price and T&M to
indicate time and material; at B, some of the contracts are a combination of the two
pricing techniques, so the relative size of the fixed price is given.
At site B, the median project costs 150k Euro; the average is 159k Euro.  At T, the
median cost of custom-made software is 120k Euro, with average of 149k.  Only three
projects include packages –  with cost between 70% and 200% of the custom-made
software.  Average project duration is about five months at B and four months in T,
although this data may be problematic as the duration of the few costly projects is
surprisingly short.
The pricing at the two sites differ, entailing separate analysis for each company;
because the number of data points in each site is very small, only basic statistical
inference is possible.  At company T, the data-set is divided into two groups, four
fixed price contracts and three time and material contracts.  Table 3 presents the mean
(and standard deviation) for the independent variables for the two groups.  Contrary to
our predictions, there is no significant difference between the two groups. The
analysis has been repeated for subjective and objective subsets of the variables to find
similar results.
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Custom SW
(thousand Euro)
Packaged SW
(thousand Euro)
Project duration
(months)
Pricing
B1 70 3 T&M
B2 70 4 FP
B3 70 12 T&M
B4 150 3 T&M
B5 200 400 3 FP 50%
B6 250 175 4 FP 40%
B7 300 6 T&M
T1 10 9 T&M
T2 18 3 T&M
T3 80 2 FP
T4 120 2 T&M
T5 175 230 9 FP
T6 300 3 FP
T7 340 3 FP
Table 2. Project data
Interestingly, the two groups differ by the software price: 162k Euro average in the
fixed price group and 224k Euro average in the time and material group.  However,
the standard deviations of around 120k do not allow to conclude that larger projects
are likelier to be time and material.
Fixed price Time and material
Risk .12 (.06) .12 (.07)
Uncertainty .42 (.06) .42 (.06)
Loss .27 (.11) .27 (.13)
Specificity .35 (.10) .39 (.11)
Confidence .74 (.05) .77 (.04)
Table 3. Group comparison at T
At company B, many contracts include both fixed price and time and material
elements.  In our data-set, there are four time and material contracts, one fixed price
and two which include both pricing techniques.  The two mixed pricing contracts
include packages, possibly hinting that custom made software is mostly priced on
time and material basis while packages at fixed price.  However, to accommodate the
variability of pricing in the seven B contracts, we use the ratio between fixed price
and time and material as the dependent variable.  It should be noted that it is possible
to compute this ratio after the completion of a project when the time and material
costs are known.  Thus, the ratio is (ex-ante) meaningful when actual and expected
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costs do differ considerably, at it is the case in our data-set.  Testing the correlation
between the ratio and the independent variables, has not found any of the predicted
relations.  We see a similar phenomenon to the observation at T, risk, specificity and
confidence scores do not relate to the pricing of a project.
5. Qualitative data and analysis
As our theoretical predictions have not been supported, we have looked for possible
explanations by asking experienced project managers for their views.  This may be
seen as a simple example of a sequential multi-method (Mingers 2001) where the
statistically analysed questionnaire is followed up by some open interviews to better
understand the results.  Two managers have been interviewed, the contact person at T
(Mr. T) and a senior IT project manager at B (Ms. B); both with ten years or more of
experience in external software development.  We raised two issues in the two
separate interviews: Firstly, what are the criteria for fixed price and for time and
material pricing?  Secondly, are risk, specificity and confidence relevant in deciding
about pricing? As a follow up, we asked how the two managers think of or define the
concepts of risk, specificity and confidence.  After these two wide questions the
interview was unstructured, however, we asked the experts to reason from a
customer’s perspective.   A summary of their answers to the first question is presented
in Table 4, and a synopsis of the reaction to the second question is given in Table 5.
Criteria for
Fixed price
Criteria for
Time and material
Ms. B - well understood projects
- reputable, experienced
vendor
- tight budget
- for coding/testing
- previous work with the
vendor
- the customer can fill-in
critical roles in the team
- for requirements/design
Mr. T - for most projects
- when hidden costs (for
changes etc.) may be
considerable
- good track record for the
vendor
- for short projects
- when tight control is
possible
Table 4. Expert views about pricing criteria
There is agreement between the two as both consider time and material only when
controlling the project by the customer is possible.  Both also consider confidence
(previous work, track record) as necessary for time and material .  Risk is hinted by
both in discussing lower risk phases (coding/testing), hidden costs, and short projects
as criteria for fixed price.  Indeed, as Mr. T tells us, at T  smaller and shorter projects
are more likely to by on time and material basis.
Risk Specificity Confidence
Ms. B When risk is high, I
prefer to control the
For very specific
projects, the
If the vendor is not
trusted, I would
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project myself
through a time and
material contract.
customer will have
difficulty to define
its needs, so
prototyping,
change
management and
time and material
are called for.
prefer a time and
material contract
with many of the
customer’s staff on
the team.
Mr. T When risk is high,
fixed price is
preferable, because
time and material
may escalate.
The fact that a
project is specific
to the company is
not used in pricing
Confidence is a
major reason to
allow for time and
material contract.
Table 5. Expert interpretations of the theoretical constructs
The view of the experts regarding the theoretical constructs is surprising. T prefers
fixed price contracts for very risky projects to prevent overruns.  However, B prefers
time and material for high risk projects because it allows tight control of the project.
Other contrasts with the theoretical prescriptions are Mr. T’s indifference regarding
specific systems, and Ms. B preference of  fixed price when confidence is high.  Table
6 accentuate these observations.
High Risk Very Specific High Confidence
THEORY T&M T&M T&M
Ms. B T&M T&M. FP
Mr. T FP - T&M
Table 6. Summary of construct interpretations
Although Mr. T is aware of the various elements of risk, he emphasises cost
uncertainty and is ready to pay the risk premium embedded in fixed price contracts.
Thus, he prefers fixed price for risky projects.  In contrast, Ms. B sees fixed price
contracts as setting up confrontational relationships between vendor and customer.
Thus, she accepts fixed price only when there is strong confidence and long
relationship with the vendor (in contrast to the prediction by Banerjee and Duflo
(2000)).  In discussing risk, she emphasises functionality uncertainty and does not see
fixed price as an answer to cost uncertainty (“The only thing that is fixed about fixed
price contracts is that this is the least you pay”).  She prefers time and material
contracts, in particular while ensuring tight customer control of the project.
6. Discussion
This paper studies the economic conditions for pricing software development services
on either fixed price or time and material basis.  We could not support the theoretical
predictions by a small survey of projects.
One explanation of this result is the weaknesses of the study, in particular our simple
theoretical setting analysing only three constructs, the small number of contracts
studied, the partial version of the risk instrument, and issues related to the validity of
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the specificity and confidence instruments.  An alternative explanation is that pricing 
of software services falls short of the sophistication assumed by economic theory.  For 
example, there is no clear relation of pricing to risk, but pricing at one site is related to 
rough proxies like project size or duration.  
Both these explanations are supported by the interviews with the two experts.  
Starting with the study limitations, the experts emphasised issues of control that we 
ignored.  Clearly, the availability of control mechanisms should be a criterion in 
deciding about the pricing of a project.  The interviews also revealed the need for 
more subtle measurement of risk.  Cost uncertainty is central to the pricing decision 
and should be measured separately from the general risk items we used. 
The interviews also demonstrate some problems in the practice of pricing software 
development.  One respondent prefers fixed price for risky projects not because of 
economic efficiency, but because of organisational considerations.  He prefers to pay 
a high premium to prevent the possibility of re-budgeting.  He also considers a narrow 
cost-centred concept of risk and ignores wider functional risks.  Interestingly, the 
expert at B suggested that the narrow interpretation of risk may result from the 
relatively simple nature of information systems at T (see Table 1), while her wider 
concept of risk results from the more complex information systems at B.  
The contribution of this paper is a careful study of an important decision related to the 
outsourcing of software development services.  There is little empirical research about 
such arrangements and any additional evidence should be useful.  Although we have 
not produced clear prescriptions, the paper should help practitioners in thinking about 
software development pricing.  
As our understanding of the studied phenomenon is limited, further research is called 
for.  In particular the study of more contracts, if possible in greater detail.  Also, case 
studies of the pricing process should be useful, especially for projects that include 
multiple pricing techniques.  
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Appendix: The Research Questionnaire 
 
Uncertainty  
The programming language was the most current available (agree/disagree) 
The computer hardware was the most current available (agree/disagree) 
What is the number of internal/external users? 
What is the number of information systems linked to this system? 
This project was larger than the typical project in the company (agree/disagree) 
Resources for the project were sufficient (agree/disagree) 
An effective development methodology existed (agree/disagree) 
The system was highly complex (agree/disagree) 
Project scope and objectives were clearly understood (agree/disagree) 
Conflicts arose between departments involved with the project (agree/disagree) 
Did the new system warrant changes to user tasks?  
This project had a high level of top management commitment (agree/disagree) 
How large is the vendor (number of employees)?  
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Potential loss 
If the system was not implemented, or had operational problems, what was the impact 
on the following areas (high- impact, low-impact): 
Customer relations  
Profitability    
Organisational efficiency 
Current daily operations  
Reputation of the IS departments 
Reputation of the user departments 
How specific was the system  
Much time and effort was invested in verbally conveying system requirements to the 
developers and or business analysts (agree/disagree)  
A newly hired system analyst needed detailed training in order to develop the system 
(agree/disagree) 
What was the delay caused by hiring and training a new system analyst to the 
development team (estimate in months)?  
Confidence 
How long has the company known this vendor?  
How many projects did your company have with the vendor?  
Were any of these projects Time and Material (yes/no)?  
What was the price of the largest project this vendor did for you?  
Previous projects with this vendor were successful (agree/disagree) 
I have confidence in the vendor’s auditing of time and materials  (agree/disagree) 
I knew the development team well (agree/disagree) 
The vendor had a very high reputation (agree/disagree) 
The vendor had implemented similar systems in other companies (agree/disagree) 
 
